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Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning,
Translation and Normative Theory
MICHAEL C. DORF*

As an initial matter, I owe a great debt to Professors Lawson, Lessig, and
Fleming for their thoughtful responses to my article.' The richness of the
positions each takes demonstrates the inevitable artificiality of the categories of
constitutional theory and theorists utilized in my principal article, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of OriginalMeaning.2 To cast Lawson in the role of originalist, Lessig as moderate originalist,
and Fleming as nonoriginalist would be to understate the degree to which each
shares the premises of the other two (and myself) and to mask the degree to
which each of the broad categories includes a great many variants. In the space
below, I consider (some of) their specific objections and try to avoid treating
each scholar as a spokesperson for, or representative of, some interpretive camp.
I.

INTERPRETATION AND ADJUDICATION

Lawson takes me and other mainstream constitutional scholars 3 to task for
failing to distinguish between interpretation-the "search for the meaning of
the interpreted document"-and adjudication-the "search for the morally
correct course of action.", 4 My initial goal here will be to show that our failure
to distinguish between interpretation and adjudication reflects a fundamental
disagreement between Lawson and us mainstream scholars, rather than mere
sloppiness on our part.
Lawson's distinction between interpretation and adjudication tracks the legal
positivist distinction between law and morality. However, positivism is only one
school of interpretation. Positivism's leading contemporary critic, Professor
Ronald Dworkin, would challenge Lawson's claim that the meaning of a legal
text will invariably be distinct from the morally correct course of action.
According to Dworkin, at least some provisions of the Constitution require
interpretation "on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about

* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, mdorf@law.columbia.edu. I received very
helpful comments on a draft of this essay from Kent Greenawalt, Gerald Neuman and the students in
my spring 1997 seminar, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation.
1. I am indebted as well to the editors of The Georgetown Law Journal for assembling this talented
cast of scholars.
2. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
OriginalMeaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997).
3. According to Lawson, my combination of interpretation and adjudication places me "squarely in
the mainstream of modem constitutional scholarship." Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes ... and
Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1824 n.9 (1997).
4. Id. at 1824.
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political decency and justice.", 5
Lawson's views about language lead him to prefer positivism to interpretive
approaches informed by political or moral principles. His example of the fried
chicken recipe illustrates his position. Lawson asks us to imagine that we have
discovered in an old Philadelphia house a late-eighteenth-century document that
appears to be a recipe for fried chicken. Although he concedes that one can
imagine a sense of the word "interpretation" in which the document is viewed
as a poem or a private diary, "[t]he presumptive meaning of a recipe is. its
original public meaning." ' 6 Thus, if one were to use rosemary where the recipe
called for pepper, Lawson argues, the substitution would best be described as
departing from, rather than changing, the meaning of the recipe-at least absent
some indication in the recipe itself that such substitutions should be permitted.7
Interpreting a recipe, in the sense of discerning its meaning, does not plunge the
reader into the realm of indeterminacy or call for the use of moral theory.8
As with recipes, so, for Lawson, with the Constitution-at least absent some
textual instruction or other clear indication that derogations from the original
meaning should be treated as constructions of the document itself. Finding no
such indication in the text or structure of the Constitution, nor in the original
understanding thereof, Lawson concludes that the meaning of the Constitution
is its original public meaning. 9
Lawson holds a plausible, but certainly not the only plausible, view of
meaning. Whether we equate meaning with original public meaning, or with
speaker's meaning, or with a dynamic conception of meaning, or with something else, depends on why we care about the meaning of whatever it is we are
interpreting. For example, if a judge were construing a contract under which
there arose a dispute as to "what is chicken?"'o he would undoubtedly look to
the terms of the contract, any applicable trade usage of those terms, dictionary
definitions, definitions in government regulations invoked by the contract, and
the course of conduct of the parties in carrying out the contract." The meaning

5. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITuTION 2
(1996).
6. Lawson, supra note 3, at 1826.
7. See id. at 1830-31.
8. I find it deliciously ironic that the canonical cooking example, first published 160 years ago,
makes a somewhat opposite point. See Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles
of Interpretation and Construction, in LAW & POL. 18 (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed.) (1837),
reprinted in 16 CARDOZo L. REv. 1883, 1904 (1995) (illustrating how the clarity of the instruction,
"fetch some soupmeat," depends upon a great many social conventions that will have differing
implications in different times and social settings). For an extended discussion of this example, see Law
and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 941 (1995). For my own modest contribution, see
Michael C. Doff, A Comment on Text, Time and Audience Understanding in Constitutional Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 983 (1995).
9. Lawson, supra note 3, at 1834.
10. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(Friendly, J.).
11. See id. at 118-20.
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thus defined might closely resemble original public meaning, but the two would
not be identical, and for good reason: contract law serves a variety of policies,
some of which may be better advanced by rules that, on occasion, select a
different conception of meaning.
My difficulty with Lawson's account of how to describe departures from the
original understanding of a chicken recipe is not merely that it artificially
separates interpretation from the goal of interpretation. Even taken on its own
terms, Lawson's recipe example provides an incomplete analogy to constitutional interpretation. In his example, the fried chicken recipe lay hidden in an
old house for hundreds of years.1 2 By contrast, the Constitution has been in
continuous use during that period. A closer analogy might be a family's written
recipe (for fried chicken, let us assume) handed down from generation to
generation.
We can imagine that, over the years, some provisions of the recipe might be
expressly deleted or amended. For example, if the family had moved from a
farm to a city, the instruction to "slaughter a large chicken," might be crossed
out and replaced with "obtain a large chicken from the market." The meaning
of other instructions might evolve through interpretation. Thus, even if everyone originally understood the recipe's requirement that the chicken be fried in
"shortening" to mean that it should be fried in lard, with a greater healthconsciousness, "vegetable oil" might replace lard as the accepted meaning of
shortening. If, some years after this transition to health-consciousness has
occurred, a family historian were to announce that her research definitively
showed that when great-great-granddaddy first devised the recipe shortening
meant lard, the family members would almost certainly treat this announcement
as a curiosity and continue to use vegetable shortening. Indeed, an attempt to
return to the original meaning would likely be met with justifiable resistance by
family members, all of whom would accept that the traditionalconstruction of
shortening is now vegetable oil.
I am willing to concede that it would not be wholly unreasonable to say that
the family practice of using vegetable oil when the recipe calls for shortening
could be described as a departure from the recipe's meaning. I think it better to
say that the recipe's meaning has changed, but there is no need to be pedantic
about the point. Whether we say that the meaning has changed or that the
meaning has remained constant but that practice has departed
from the meaning
13
depends on why we care about what the recipe means.
12. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 1825.
13. If I may be permitted one more analogy, I would invoke the story of the ship of Theseus. The
ship of Theseus is constructed of wooden planks. Over the years, some of the planks become worn and
are replaced by new planks. Eventually, all the planks are replaced; nonetheless, we would not object to
identifying the resulting ship as the ship of Theseus. Indeed, if someone were now to discover and
reassemble the discarded planks into the original configuration, we would probably hesitate to declare
the reassembled planks the ship. We might say that part of what it means to be the ship of Theseus
today is to have come through the continuous experience of the past. Nevertheless, our linguistic
practice leaves open the possibility that one might refer to either ship as the ship of Theseus. Whether
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However, the choice of a conception of meaning makes a great deal of
difference for what Lawson would call adjudication. To make matters concrete,
when a Supreme Court Justice is asked to invalidate an act of Congress as
unconstitutional, according to Lawson the Justice should first consider what the
Constitution means (that is, what it originally meant), and then decide whether
to vote in accordance with the Constitution or in accordance with some other
principle. Putting the matter this way, it is hard to imagine that the Justice
would ever choose to invalidate a law based upon some nonconstitutional
principle because, at least in our legal culture, the only warrant for judicial
invalidation of legislation is inconsistency with the meaning of the Constitution.' 4 To adopt Lawson's approach would give adjudication-and thus moral
principles-a negligible role 15 compared with the role granted to the discovery
of original meaning. 16 But of course, if linguistic practice does not by itself
select original meaning over evolving meaning, then we must have some other
reason for framing the initial question the way Lawson does.
Whether to treat the Constitution's original meaning as its current meaning is
not a linguistic question. When our linguistic practices leave an open space,
something else must help us decide whether to prefer originalism or some other
interpretive methodology to fill it. To Lawson's credit, he avoids the hubris of
those originalists who assume that originalism is not even a theory but the
7
natural and only way to approach the Constitution and other legal texts.'
Lawson recognizes that originalism must be justified in normative terms.' 8 As
we prefer one or the other depends upon the reason we have for caring about the ship of Theseus. For
an excellent discussion of this topic, see ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 33-34 (1981).
See also Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis,
105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2081 (1996).
14. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 397-400 (1798) (Iredell, J.). This is why stare decisis is
a problematic doctrine for originalists; a system of precedent demands that they sometimes sacrifice
their account of constitutional meaning. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). By contrast, for an eclectic, precedent is part of
meaning.
15. I say "negligible" rather than "nonexistent" because there might be circumstances in which the
result ordained by the Constitution is so monstrous that the Court would feel justified in overriding the
Constitution. Claims brought by slaveowners under the Fugitive Slave Act placed northern abolitionist
judges in such circumstances. See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 54-55 (1975); RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 219 (1986).

16. Unless, that is, one believes that the original meaning itself invokes broad moral principles
whose content later interpreters supply. I do not read Lawson to take such a view.
17. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 5

(1990) (stating that for a judge to be bound by the law "means that he is bound by the only thing that
can be called law, the principles of the text, whether the Constitution or statute, as generally understood
by the enactments"); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
37-41 (1997) (contrasting originalism and textualism with dynamic modes of interpretation, which are
deemed lawmaking).
18. Lawson's reason for seeking a normative justification for originalism is rather different from my
own. He believes that the decision to treat meaning as original meaning can be made on linguistic
grounds alone; he then asks whether there are good normative reasons to treat the Constitution's
(necessarily original) meaning as binding. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 1824-25. I disagree with the
former claim, but applaud the latter inquiry.
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he acknowledges, however, his comment only hints at the "form that such a
[normative] defense might take."' 9 Nevertheless, it is worth noting just how
weak that defense appears to be.2 °
Lawson categorically rejects what my principal article treats as the standard
normative justification for originalism: social contract theory. He agrees with
me that a past act of ratification cannot bind the present generation. 2 ' Indeed,
Lawson goes further, arguing that even present-day acceptance does not establish the Constitution's authority. As he puts it, "[tihere is22 simply no way to
bridge the gap between A's acceptance and B's obligation.",
At the conclusion of his tale of the fried chicken recipe, Lawson suggests an
alternative justification for selecting original over evolutionary meaning: what
he calls "the argument from coordination.",2 3 The argument from coordination
posits that even if there is general consensus that the original meaning of the
Constitution is imperfect, if there is no consensus about how to remedy its
imperfections, securing agreement on what should replace the original meaning
may be so costly that as a society we are better off sticking with the original
meaning. 24 So long as the original meaning does not lead to dreadful consequences, it will be better than the available alternatives.2 5
One of the three key assumptions in this argument is dubious and the other
two are dead wrong. The dubious assumption is that it will be easier to reach
agreement about original meaning than about meaning determined through
some other method. Perhaps there are occasions when this is true, but it is often
untrue, especially with respect to matters of great importance.2 6
Second, even if we thought that originalism were more often determinate
than the alternative methods of discovering meaning, the coordination costs of
adopting originalism would be, in many instances, much greater than those of
other methods. Invalidation of the administrative state or of paper money on the
grounds that they are inconsistent with the original understanding would be
19. Id. at 1825.
20. I half suspect that this is deliberate on Lawson's part, as he states that he comes close to being "a
strict interpretive originalist [while] forcefully deny[ing] that the Constitution has any political legitimacy." Id. at 1825 & n.10.
21. Id. at 1835.
22. Id. Lawson thus rejects what he deems my "present-day acceptance theory." Id. at 1836. The
passage in my principal article to which Lawson refers states that "[t]he authority of the Constitution
today rests on its general acceptance as authoritative rather than on its adoption in 1787." Doff, supra
note 2, at 1772. I meant (and mean) this in the positivist sense that rough popular consensus warrants
legal actors and other observers in treating the Constitution as binding law, as the sources I cited
indicate. See id. at 1772 n.28. I do not contend that contemporary consensus provides a normative
justification for the legal order that the Constitution establishes, although it certainly plays a role in
such a justification.
23. Lawson, supra note 3, at 1832.
24. See id. at 1832-33.
25. See id. at 1833.
26. The debate about whether state-imposed term limits on members of Congress are consistent with
the original understanding illustrates how contentious questions of original meaning can be. See U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1856-60 (1995).
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extremely disruptive of the existing political order. In this sense, Lawson's27
suggestion that we face a choice between "keeping with" original meaning
and adopting something new gets most matters exactly backwards: honoring
original meaning would usually require fundamental changes in the status quo.
Finally, the assumption that originalism does not lead to dreadful consequences ignores originalism's greatest weakness. Quite apart from the social
disruptions that a reversion to original meaning would entail, such a reversion
would require adoption of what are now generally understood to be substantively unjust principles-such as permitting state-sponsored racial segregation, 28 nearly all forms of sex discrimination, 29 and state and local establishment
of particular religious sects. 30 The Herculean efforts of originalists to reclaim
Brown v. Board of Education3 1 illustrate how seriously they take this criti3
CiM32
cism.
II. TRANSLATION

Much of the foregoing criticism of Lawson's approach is consistent with
Lessig's theory of fidelity as translation. Lessig's theory primarily aims to
dislodge accounts of fidelity (such as Lawson's) that privilege original understanding. Recall that Lessig believes it possible for a changed reading of text to
remain faithful to the original meaning because the object worth preserving is
the combination of text plus context, or meaning.33 As I noted in my principal
article, that basic observation is sound; indeed, much of originalism's residual
force for nonoriginalists may derive from the need to resort to context to locate
a suitable starting point for interpretation. 34 Yet translation is a problematic
metaphor for the very same reason that Lawson's metaphor of discovery is
problematic: both ignore the period of interpretation and experience that transpired between the Constitution's adoption and the present.
Translation of a document from one language to another is essentially a
quantum event, not a continuous process. For example, to translate a document
from Swedish to Italian, one would not first translate from Swedish to Danish,
27. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 1833.
28. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Cultural Crisis of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2337-43
(1995) (book review).
29. See Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161 (stating that "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
contemplate sex equality"). But cf Nina Morris, Note, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth
Amendment: Lost History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153 (1988) (arguing that the women's suffrage movement had
some influence on the congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 23 (1965).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 17, at 82-83 (describing the original understanding of equal
protection at a higher level of abstraction than originalists usually invoke); Michael W. McConnell,
Originalismand the DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995).
33. Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistenceof Bellbottom Theory: What a ConstitutionalTheory
Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1840.
34. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 1796-1800.
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then from Danish to German, then from German to French, and finally from
French to Italian, even though if one were to embark on a journey from Sweden
to Italy, one might well pass through Denmark, Germany, and France en route.
Moving from spatial to temporal dimensions, Lessig's metaphor of translation
implies that the meaning of the eighteenth-century Constitution may be obtained by blocking out the historical journey that the Constitution and the nation
have taken since then. 35 Translation, therefore, is an imperfect metaphor because it would replace constitutional history with a time machine.
One might argue that this objection lacks practical bite because the present
context will usually reflect changes that have occurred in the past. Although this
will often be true, it will not inevitably be so, and in any event, excluding a
more direct consideration of post-enactment events robs constitutional interpretation of the richness of history's lessons. To use an example I explored in my
36
principal article, the question at the heart of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton whether the federal government derives its power from the people of the several
states or from the people of the United States-would, under Lessig's quantum
approach, proceed without direct consideration of the lessons taught by the
Civil War.
A more fundamental problem with the translation metaphor is that it privileges original meaning in much the same way as Lawson's discovery metaphor
does. To return to our language translation analogy, we would expect that a
translation from Swedish to Danish to German to French to Italian would
preserve less of the original meaning than would a direct translation from
Swedish to Italian. Indeed, in the former case we would expect the meaning to
become considerably garbled, as in the parlor game "telephone." Yet to state
the matter this way immediately begs the central question that divides originalists and nonoriginalists: namely, is an interpretation that departs substantially
from the original meaning ipso facto an inferior interpretation than one that is
closer to the original meaning of the text? For Lessig to answer this question in
the affirmative, as his use of the translation metaphor appears to require, he
must have in mind a normative reason for preferring originalism; he must have
a reason to care about fidelity to the suitably translated original meaning of the
Constitution, rather than to some other, nonoriginalist conception of the Constitution's meaning. As I have argued above with respect to Lawson's views,3 7 as
well as in my principal article and elsewhere, there are good reasons to be
skeptical about the possibility of such an account.
35. This statement must be qualified by the fact that Lessig recognizes interaction effects occasioned
by new pieces of text; thus, Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), is legitimate on his view because the
Fourteenth Amendment alters the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1995). Although I am
skeptical whether Lessig's view of interaction effects is consistent with his other interpretive commitments, we may put such matters aside. The main point is that Lessig does not give interpretive weight
to the continuous unfolding of events that do not give rise to textual change.
36. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32
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HI. THEORIES, GREAT AND SMALL
Lessig's comment in this volume challenges the need for a normative theory
of constitutional law by associating theory with the kinds of foundationalist
accounts of knowledge that postmodernists routinely criticize. 38 He disagrees
with the notion that "constitutional practice rests upon theory." 3 9
My account of arguments based on original meaning can illustrate Lessig's
objection to foundationalist constitutional theory. I argue in my principal article
that conventional originalists invoke original meaning because they subscribe to
a social contract theory of the legitimacy of the Constitution and constitutional
interpretation. Lessig disagrees. In his view, neither social contract theory nor
anything else need underlie originalism.4° He argues that the important thing is the
practice of originalism, rather than the theory that happens to be associated with it.
It is for this reason, according to Lessig, that although my originalism is not
that of the conventional originalists, it is "originalism nonetheless.", 4 Fleming,
by contrast, takes me to task for labeling my ancestral and heroic accounts of
original meaning forms of "originalism. ' ' 42 Their disagreement is not merely
semantic; indeed, it implicates the very important question of whether one
needs to provide a justificatory account of constitutional practice. Fleming
appears to say that practice requires justification; Lessig thinks not. Although it
will take some explaining, I would like to agree with both of them.
The targets of Lessig's antifoundationalism are normative theories that attempt to deduce concrete results in particular cases from a relatively small
number of foundational norms. Dworkin's moral reading appears to be such an
account because it asks judges "to find the best conception of constitutional
moral principles-the best understanding of what equal moral status for men
and women really requires, for example-that fits the broad story of America's
historical record.", 4 3 Lessig correctly notes that some passages of my principal
article could be read to endorse the view that the goal of normative constitutional theory is thus to justify the best descriptive account of constitutional
practice at the wholesale level. 44 To defend my approach against Lessig's
38. For my own brief account of postmodemism and the law, see Michael C. Doff, Truth, Justice,
and the American Constitution,97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 144-52 (1997).
39. Lessig, supra note 33, at 1838.
40. Id. Note that this is not a claim about what most originalists actually believe (although Lawson
makes such a claim, at least on his own behalf).
41. Id. at 1837.
42. James E. Fleming, OriginalMeaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1855 (1997). I
consider this a friendly suggestion, and would be happy to substitute "ancestral and heroic models of
the utility of arguments based on original meaning" for the pithier but, I recognize, less accurate
"ancestral and heroic oiginalism."
43. DwoRm, supra note 5, at 11.
44. Lessig asks whether I might mean "to deduce from th[e] structure of eclecticism the values, or
set of values, implicit, or inherent, or permanent, or grounding of our constitutional tradition." Lessig,
supra note 33, at 1847. I do not mean to suggest this, although in a footnote, my principal article cites
Dworkin for a somewhat narrower claim that could be construed along these lines. See Doff, supra note
2, at 1772 n.30.
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critique might therefore seem to require a defense of foundationalism, but I
shall not offer one. In my view, Lessig mistakenly assumes that a normative
account must be foundationalist. As I have argued elsewhere with respect to
Dworkin, however, a normative theory of constitutional interpretation need not
be a form of foundationalism.
Let us distinguish between two conceptions of justification. Fleming illustrates the distinction when he writes that for my project to succeed, I "need to
provide a full normative account of constitutional interpretation" and to "show
how such an account entails or requires, or is otherwise linked to [my] descriptive account.", 45 What would it mean for a normative account to entail a
descriptive account? One possibility is that the normative account underlies the
descriptive account, in a manner that Lessig argues (and I agree) reflects an
outmoded way of picturing the world: 46 the descriptive theory sits atop the
47
normative theory just as a small turtle might sit atop the back of a larger turtle.
A second possibility, and one that I think fits more comfortably with Fleming's,
Dworkin's, and certainly my own overall commitments, is simply that one must
constantly test one's descriptive account against principles of justice. There is
no reason to suppose that this normative process must, as a whole, undergird the
descriptive account. Instead, the descriptive and normative accounts sit on the
same plane, where they make contact at a variety of places. On this view, when
I say that some political theory (such as social contract theory) underlies some
interpretive method (such as originalism),4 9 I mean only that if one is asked
what normative reasons she has for applying the interpretive method, she will
point to the political theory (and possibly to other places as well).
To use a familiar philosophical image, we may think of the body of constitutional law as a web of text, history, practice, and other conventional sources of
law. 4 9 In most of the interesting constitutional cases, these sources will be
consistent with a variety of outcomes. Best understood, normative constitutional
theory is simply a fancy name for the process by which a judge, when faced
with ambiguous guidance from this web of sources, takes into account considerations of justice.
Such normative considerations interact with the descriptive account in two
ways. First, when the Court decides a case based upon, among other things,
principles of justice, that decision itself becomes assimilated into the body of
law that will be applied in future cases. In other words, the very nature of
precedent integrates descriptive and normative accounts. This process of integra45. Fleming, supra note 42, at 1850.
46. Of course the fact that a view is out of fashion is not by itself proof that the view is erroneous. It
may even make a comeback, as bellbottom jeans did in 1993.
47. I mean to evoke the familiar criticism of foundationalism based upon the infinite regress
captured by the picture of "turtles all the way down." See Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal
Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1986) (tracing the example to William James).
48. See Dorf, supra note 2, at 1767 (stating that there is a political theory underlying strict
originalism).
49. See generallyW.V. QutrE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970).
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tion pulls and pushes on the web, subtly changing its shape. The changes are
small, because the overall pattern of constitutional practice, like other sets of
beliefs about the world, resists wholesale change. The pragmatist view that
knowledge accumulates incrementally provides a close analogue to the ways in
which constitutional doctrine and theory change as new social arrangements are
tested against evolving normative views. 50
Second, principles of justice sometimes directly challenge, rather than incrementally supplement, the other sources of law. Especially in times of social
transformation, old doctrines and methodologies have a difficult time accommodating new understandings premised on principles with which they are fundamentally inconsistent. Borrowing a term from Professor Cornel West, Professor
William Eskridge invokes "prophetic pragmatism" 51 to describe the challenge
that new attitudes created by sympathetic stories of same-sex love pose for the
military's anti-homosexual policy and the legal regime that supports it. Here the
principles of justice self-consciously attack the existing web of practice and
belief.
The difficulty Brown poses for originalists illustrates this direct confrontation
between principles of justice and the other sources of law. 52 Minor tinkering
with the originalist view of legitimacy cannot reconcile it with the virtually
unchallengeable proposition that Brown was rightly decided. Instead, Brown's
rightness challenges originalism head-on. The procrustean efforts that originalists make to explain Brown demonstrate their recognition that a mode of
argument that leads to manifest injustice stands in need of substantial justification. Likewise, those few originalists who recognize that Brown is wrongly
decided under their theory invoke some purportedly higher moral principle to
50. William James writes:
The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts
them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they
contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise
in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then
had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of
opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme
conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion, and then that (for they resist change
very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient
stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock
and the new experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expediently.
This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older stock of truths with a
minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but
conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible.
(1907), reprinted in THE
WRrnINGS OF WILIAM JAMES: A CoMiPREaIJsivE EDnoN 376, 382-83 (John J. McDermott ed., 1967).
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 621-31 (1994) (citing
Cornel West, The Limits of Neopragmatism, in PRAGMATISM INLAW AND SOCIETY 121, 121 (Michael
Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991)).
52. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 294-300 (arguing that Robert Bork's defense of Brown contradicts
Bork's other interpretive commitments).
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support originalism-typically the claim that judicial review's supposedly antiexcept when it enforces the codified
democratic character makes it illegitimate
53
intentions of an earlier supermajority.
In my principal article, I argued that the conventional social-contractarian
justification for strict originalism is problematic, especially when it leads to
substantially unjust results. The point I wish to emphasize here is that Brown
does not merely render strict originalism problematic; it also challenges moderate originalism, in a way that less momentous cases do not, because it forces us
to reexamine why we care about original understanding at all. When moderate
originalists attempt to construct a normative case for giving some weight, but
not decisive weight, to original understanding, we find that social contract
theory does a poor job. On its own it is a problematic theory, and if accepted, it
crowds out principles of justice that we are unwilling to sacrifice. Thus we are
led, I contend, to quite different sorts of reasons for caring about original
meaning-what my principal article terms contextual, ancestral, and heroic
conceptions of original meaning.
I do not understand Lessig to object to normative constitutional theory
characterized in the way I have been describing. What makes this account
normative is that it gives an important role to principles of justice. What makes
it theory is that it attempts to explain the relationship between our past and
present interpretive practices on the one hand, and our reasons for thinking
these practices should continue to guide us on the other. But there is no reason
to believe that such an explanation is a single structure undergirding the
descriptive account.
54
Thus, I find Lessig's criticism of my analysis of Bradwell v. Illinois
mysterious. He says that I attempt to show that Bradwell is wrong by attributing
to the Court a factually mistaken view, but he overlooks the degree to which I
disapprove of Bradwell on normative grounds. 55 He attributes to me the view
that changed factual predicates justify changed constitutional readings, while
changed value judgments only justify change through the political process.5 6
I do not deny that I regard the Bradwell decision as based in part on factually
mistaken views. Part of the contemporary objection to the decision in Bradwell
is that it rested on faulty biological, that is to say factual, claims about the
innate differences between men and women. Of course, these factual claims
must be judged relative to our current understandings of the world, rather than
from an absolute perspectiveless position. How else could they be judged? But
recognizing that the Bradwell opinion is factually outdated does not deny that it
is also morally outdated-as I noted by referring to its rhetoric as "distasteful"
53. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion to Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 93 (1995)
(arguing that Brown conflicts with the original understanding and is therefore wrongly decided).
54. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
55. See Lessig, supra note 33, at 1844.
56. See id. at 1845.
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in my principal article. 57 The whole enterprise in which I am engagedintegrating descriptive and normative accounts--dissolves the dichotomy between "fact" and "value" that Lessig claims I embrace. Or, to put it more
affirmatively, Lessig and I do not appear to disagree.58
IV.

CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE

What then, can I say in response to Fleming's charge that my principal article
does not, in fact, integrate normative and descriptive constitutional theory
because it fails to provide a full normative account? 59 I confess that he is right. I
chose to omit such an account for two reasons.
First, as Lessig correctly observes, 60 my goal in the principal article is
primarily negative: to dislodge an account of the relevance of original understanding that is widely accepted, even among scholars and judges who reject strict
originalism. I doubt very much that I could propound a full normative account
of constitutional law that all of these scholars and judges would accept. What I
can do, however, is explain why anyone who rejects a static view of social
contract theory should see the relevance of original meaning in contextual,
ancestral, and heroic terms-regardless of the particular nonsocial-contractarian
normative account she actually holds. Thus, Fleming is right that throughout my
principal article "the term 'nonoriginalism' basically serves as a placeholder for
a normative account that is never developed."- 61 To have developed such an
account would have limited the effectiveness of my negative program by
linking it with what would inevitably have been a controversial positive program.
Second, and more importantly, I chose not to develop a complete normative
account because I believe that such a project is misguided-if what is meant by
a complete normative account is the sort of foundationalism Lessig critiques.
Fleming suggests that I could borrow a normative account from Dworkin, or
from Professor Lawrence Sager, or from himself. Although Fleming rightly
observes that my jurisprudential commitments have much in common with
Dworkin's moral reading, Sager's justice-seeking constitutionalism, 62 and Fleming's own Constitution-perfecting constructivism, as a rhetorical matter, I think
that each of these theories is too easily described-or misdescribed-as founda-

57. Dorf, supra note 2, at 1809.
58. We do not appear to disagree on this point, anyway. As I have noted, I am skeptical about the
utility of Lessig's preferred metaphor of interpretation as translation, even in its relatively modest form.
59. See Fleming, supra note 42, at 1850.
60. See Lessig, supra note 33, at 1837 (applauding "theorists who work to wrest a theory of
constitutional fidelity from the hands of mindless originalists").
61. Fleming, supra note 42, at 1851. He is also right that this terminology runs the risk of
reinforcing "the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best (or indeed the only)
conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation." Id. at 1855.
62. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410, 417 (1993) (discussing the "justice-seeking Constitution").
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tionalist. 63 The best reading of Dworkin 64 takes the principle of integrity as
equivalent to the postmodernist's account of a web of knowledge. But that is by
no means the only, nor even the most common, reading of Dworkin. Even
without setting forth a foundationalist normative theory, I seem to have misled
Lessig into thinking that I did and Fleming into thinking that I meant to; to have
incorporated by reference the views of Dworkin, Sager, or Fleming would have
likely exacerbated the problem.

63. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRuTH 111-17 (1996).
64. By which I mean, of course, the reading that makes Dworkin's theory the best theory it can be.

